

Scope and limits of sub-state international cooperation. The experience of the bioceanic corridors

Alcances y límites de la cooperación internacional subestatal. La experiencia de los corredores bioceánicos

Gonzalo Álvarez^{a*}  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5801-8997>
Giovana Gómez Amigo^b  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2068-8741>
Haroldo Dilla Alfonso^a  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7744-8362>

^a Universidad Arturo Prat, Instituto de Estudios Internacionales, Santiago, Chile, e-mail: goalvarez@unap.cl, hdilla@unap.cl

^b Servicio Nacional de Prevención y Respuestas ante Desastres, Santiago, Chile, e-mail: giovanagomezamigo@gmail.com

Abstract

The article aims to investigate the relations and international strategies undertaken by sub-state actors to promote their regions and ports through bioceanic corridors. Using a qualitative methodology, focused on primary sources and interviews with participants in this type of initiative in the northern region of Chile, we analyzed the strategies and interactions between these actors, with the central government and at the international level. As a result, the scope and limits of subnational international cooperation are identified. We conclude that over twenty years after the start of projects such as the bioceanic corridors, and despite a broad and prolonged deployment of international actions by those actors, they still have not materialized.

Keywords: bioceanic corridors, subnational actors, paradiplomacy, international cooperation, north of Chile.

Resumen

El artículo tiene como objetivo indagar en las relaciones y estrategias internacionales que emprenden los actores subestatales para la promoción de sus regiones a través de corredores bioceánicos. Mediante una metodología cualitativa, centrada en fuentes primarias y entrevistas a los participantes de este tipo de iniciativas en el norte grande de Chile, son analizadas dichas estrategias y las interacciones que se producen entre estos actores, con el gobierno central y en el nivel internacional. Como resultado, se identifican los alcances y límites de la cooperación internacional subnacional. Se concluye que, a más de veinte años del inicio de

Received on May 16, 2022.

Accepted on May 3, 2023.

Published on May 17, 2023.

* Corresponding author: Gonzalo Álvarez. E-mail: goalvarez@unap.cl

ORIGINAL ARTICLE LANGUAGE:
SPANISH.



This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Atribución 4.0 Internacional.

CITATION: Álvarez, G., Gómez Amigo, G. & Dilla Alfonso, H. (2023). Alcances y límites de la cooperación internacional subestatal. La experiencia de los corredores bioceánicos [Scope and limits of sub-state international cooperation. The experience of the bioceanic corridors]. *Estudios Fronterizos*, 24, e120. <https://doi.org/10.21670/ref.2309120>

proyectos como los corredores bioceánicos, y pese a un amplio y prolongado despliegue de acciones internacionales por dichos actores, todavía no se materializan.

Palabras clave: corredores bioceánicos, actores subnacionales, paradiplomacia, cooperación internacional, norte de Chile.

Introduction

The global context, interdependence, and the weakening of states have allowed other actors in the international system, such as sub-state or sub-national governments, to play a greater role. At the same time, they have found in international action an opportunity to promote the development of their regions, for which they have carried out strategies and international initiatives and formed links with their foreign counterparts to achieve their goals.

The case of bioceanic corridors (BOC) stands out among the many international initiatives undertaken. These projects, which seek to connect two or more countries through infrastructure works and services to facilitate international trade, have become a recognized instance of sub-state relations and cooperation between different national governments in interstate relations and organizations for Latin American integration.

BOCs play a strategic role in the development of localities that are isolated or far from financial and commercial centers by connecting them with other regions and integrating them into trade and production chains, which also benefits the States by increasing tax revenues (Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana [IIRSA], 2003; Inostroza Fernández & Bolívar Espinoza, 2004; Herbas Camacho, & Molina, 2005). Thus, in Latin America, BOCs have been promoted by various Atlantic, Pacific and inland States, by economic organizations such as the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, by cooperation and integration organizations such as the Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur), the Comunidad Andina (Can), and the Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (Unasur), among others, which have emphasized the importance of physical integration for the development of the countries and regions of the continent.

Paradoxically, despite this favorable outlook for cooperation through the BOCs, and after decades of efforts to implement various projects, their results are not fully visible in practice. Why do these types of projects not materialize despite the impulse received from multiple levels and the undeniable benefits that their implementation brings?

On the one hand, the literature on regional (non)integration has focused the causes of the lack of cooperation on issues such as inter-presidentialism or presidential diplomacy (Malamud, 2005) and the lack of political harmony between presidents, the asymmetry between States, the absence of expectations about obtaining benefits, among others, which emphasize States and central governments (Malamud & Gardini, 2012; Durán Lima & Masi, 2007). On the other hand, there is an emerging dimension of study that focuses on other actors, such as subnational governments (Aldecoa & Keating, 2001; González M. et al., 2016; Linares, 2005; Maira, 2010; Oddone & Ramos, 2018).

From the latter, it is possible to note important factors that limit cooperation and the realization of cooperation projects, revealing the scope of subnational international relations. This type of cooperation is facilitated or hindered by multiple variables, such as the existence of coherent projects and strategies or the subnational governments' prerogatives, resources, and levels of autonomy. In the specific context of Latin America, the type of relationships between subnational actors, the material and institutional resources of the regions, and the relationship between the regions and the centers of state power have been discussed.

This paper's context aims to investigate the international relations and strategies undertaken by sub-state actors to promote their regions through BOCs. Through the study of the cases of the regions of Arica and Parinacota, Tarapacá (focused on the municipality of Iquique), and Antofagasta in northern Chile—in which primary and secondary sources are analyzed, and where the visions of relevant actors who have led or participated in the international initiatives of these two regions and one municipality¹ are contrasted—, it is argued that although sub-state actors develop strategies and undertake international cooperation initiatives that can contribute both to the achievement of their objectives and the development of projects such as the BOCs, their materialization is limited by the lack of planning and coordination from the central power and among the regions, by the lack of a continuous and coordinated relationship among them, and by the apathy of the center to regional international initiatives.

In considering the above, although the research findings emphasize the national and intra-regional processes that influence external action, they also show the need to consider the regions and their interrelations as an essential part of cooperation for the materialization of integration projects beyond the economic benefits that can be obtained through them.

The article is structured as follows. First, the discussion of sub-state actors in international relations is carried out. Second, the debate on bioceanic corridors in Latin America is presented. Third, the framework of the external initiatives of sub-state actors in Chile is analyzed. Fourth, subnational international action in the Norte Grande of Chile is studied through the cases of the regions of Arica and Parinacota, Tarapacá (municipality of Iquique), and Antofagasta.

Sub-state actors and international relations

International relations were constituted based on a model in which States and their political centers sought to establish themselves as the exclusive representatives of the interests of their sovereign territories in the international arena. Nevertheless, various processes, such as globalization, interdependence, cooperation, and the emergence of sub-State and non-State actors, have undermined the power of States and their

¹ Chile is a unitary state, but administratively it is divided into 15 regions, which are administered by regional governments. In turn, the regions are divided into multiple municipalities. For this work, two regions (Arica and Parinacota; Antofagasta) and one municipality (Iquique, which is part of the Tarapacá region) in the northern part of the country are analyzed. The rationale for this selection is based on the fact that the Tarapacá region does not currently have an international unit, but the municipality of Iquique (the largest in the region) has extensive international connections.

representation in the international system. In this context, they have had to adapt. On the one hand, they have ceded capacities and powers to supranational bodies and regimes, and on the other hand, they have decentralized and deconcentrated power to regional and local administrations within their territories (Jessop, 2003).

This has strengthened these institutions at the international level, where their authorities have promoted links with their foreign counterparts. Regional and local governments have gradually implanted themselves in the international system in search of inserting “their activities within a world dominated by national governments and transnational organizations” (Keating, 2001, p. 40). This has been called “paradiplomacy”, which, among other purposes—political, social, and cultural—has positioned itself as a practice of sub-state governments to promote the development of their territories through cooperation with other actors beyond their borders.

According to Keating (2001, p. 42), in globalization, regions have become key players that increasingly compete in world markets but “whose success depends on the ability to mount a coherent project, exploiting the energies of both the public and private sectors”. This has stimulated the study of territorial coordination mechanisms between actors, groups, and institutions in favor of development in the regions, where local authorities act as entrepreneurial agents for the improvement of local manufacturing advantages and capacities, and the generation of value chains, among others, through different strategies (Oddone et al., 2016).

Although the scenario described above may be considered favorable for the exercise of paradiplomacy, the literature on this type of experience has shown a series of conditioning factors for its exercise. These include the prerogatives that the central power grants to subnational governments; the relations of conflict or cooperation between these two levels; the representativeness of subnational governments; and the link between the national agenda and regional interests (Lecours, 2002). As Keating (2001, p. 46) argues, “political factors are perhaps the most important in determining the possibilities and limitations of paradiplomacy”, where the attitude of central governments is key since they often consider international affairs as exclusive to them. Leadership is also considered a relevant factor for the success of paradiplomacy. While many international links between regions have arisen through the action of key actors, their deterioration has also corresponded to the departure or loss of interest of these actors in these initiatives, denoting, in turn, their lack of institutionalization (Keating, 2001).

In addition to these general elements, for the specific case of Latin America, part of the literature has focused on the differences between the national centers and the regions, where the latter—especially those located on the territory’s borders—lag behind the national capitals. In addition to the inequalities linked to lower economic and human development in many of these regions, their peripheral territorial status concerning the center has also been expressed in terms of geographic and infrastructure isolation, lack of leadership, institutional precariousness, and the absence of value chains beyond the border (Juste & Oddone, 2020).

As for political factors, one of the most notable characteristics in Latin America has been the strong centralist component in international relations (Álvarez Fuentes & Ovando Santana, 2020; Fuentes Vera, 2014). This has been attributed to the very formation of the modern state and its evolution, considering elements such as the geopolitical imprint that has influenced its construction. During the 19th century, after the independence processes and the inter-state conflicts that followed, rigid

border boundary policies were established (Cid, 2013; Estefane, 2014; González Miranda, 2004). In the 20th century, through the influence of the military in the State, national security discourses and policies linked to the concentration of power in the center and the exclusion of the regions located on the borders, given their proximity to territories of potential sovereign disputes, were promoted (Serje de la Ossa, 2017; Álvarez et al., 2022).

This has contributed to the exclusion of the regions from foreign policy and to a distrustful view of the relations that subnational governments establish with their counterparts across borders, especially with neighboring countries. Consequently, although regulations and mechanisms have been established that aim at the international projection of subnational governments, they do so with limited degrees of autonomy and lack the necessary resources to carry out effective paradiplomatic activity (Álvarez et al., 2022; González M. et al., 2016; Linares, 2005).

Despite the strong framework of historical, political, and institutional constraints and the lagging behind of the regions in comparison to the center of the State, paradiplomatic activity has become a tool for subnational actors to seek better conditions for their territories through different international strategies and initiatives, including decentralized cooperation, the creation of cooperation agencies, and international corridor projects, among others (Boisier, 2003; González M. et al., 2016; González Miranda, 2009; Oddone & Ramos, 2018).

For this case study, initiatives such as international corridors and the strategies that regional governments undertake for their development are key to understanding the limits and scope of international cooperation at the subnational level in a context of opportunities offered by the global environment and restrictions on regional action—in addition to their conditions—that persist in Latin America.

Bioceanic corridors in Latin America, debates, and stakeholders

BOCs are projects promoted by various actors—national governments, subnational governments, international organizations, and the private sector—that aim to create an adequate infrastructure to facilitate trade between distant territories that transcend national boundaries. In Latin America, BOCs have been recognized because they seek to facilitate connections between Atlantic and Pacific ports and because they have become a recognized instance of cooperation between subnational actors from different countries to promote the development of their regions (Herbas Camacho & Molina, 2005; Iirsa, 2003; Inostroza Fernández & Bolívar Espinoza, 2004; Suarez Arevalo, 1997).

Within this context, BOCs play a strategic role in development as infrastructure projects aimed at improving transport links in peripheral and isolated regions characterized by fragile local markets with limited or specialized production (Inostroza Fernández & Bolívar Espinoza, 2004; Suarez Arevalo, 1997). These routes, in addition to commercial corridors, involve the development of communication routes and industrial and tourist corridors (Herbas Camacho & Molina, 2005), which positively affect both the localities involved and government revenues (Inostroza Fernández & Bolívar Espinoza, 2004; Iirsa, 2003).

In practice, and in contrast, it should also be noted that the management approach promoted for these mega-projects, despite the impulse from the regions, has prioritized the central role of central governments—through foreign affairs ministries and other sectoral portfolios—in defining the scope and design of the projects, without granting a significant role to local stakeholders. In this vein, there have been warnings about the implementation problems of the BOC, since the characteristics of the territories where these projects would be located were not considered, where the main obstacle is the inadequate provision of infrastructure and services (Bouzas & Knaack, 2009; Rozas, 2010). Cooperation through such projects can also be hindered by disputes over where investments will be directed and by institutional differences and responsibilities between regions (Keating, 2001). Accordingly, the results of paradiplomatic action tend to be concentrated among national, provincial, or departmental capital cities and those located near major infrastructure works (Oddone et al., 2016).

Both in terms of facilitation and hindrance, given their nature, BOCs have also been part of the agenda of regional integration organizations and relations between South American countries. In this area, it is recognized that regional organizations and the conduct of foreign policies have had a strong presidential imprint (Malamud & Gardini, 2012), leaving a narrow margin for the participation of other actors, including subnational ones. Despite this, they have also developed incipient governance that has sought to promote BOCs actively.

Among the experiences linked to the BOCs where these trends can be observed, is the Initiative for the Integration of South American Regional Infrastructure (IIRSA), which arose at the first Summit of South American Heads of State (2000), which later, under the influence of Unasur, became part of the South American Council for Infrastructure and Planning (Cosiplan). Although it was expected that, under the umbrella of this organization, the initiative would have greater political significance (Moncayo S., 2012), in addition to promoting an approach focused on “territories inhabited by peoples and nations” (Zibechi, 2016, p. 2), the truth is that it maintained an intergovernmental character limited to representatives of central governments, with scarce resources and funding for proposals (Carciofi & Gayá, 2016); to which was added the decay of Unasur in subsequent years (Barros et al., 2021).

Parallel to the IIRSA, in 2015, the governments of Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina and Chile adhered to the Declaration of Asuncion, agreeing to create and promote the Bioceanic Road Corridor (CBV).² This corridor is considered an opportunity to promote convergence between the Mercosur bloc and the Pacific Alliance by granting access to the Atlantic countries to the Asia-Pacific markets in better conditions, at lower costs, and with greater flexibility (Atienza et al., 2020). This project was ratified in the Brasilia Declaration (2017) and maintains a work agenda and works in progress (Barros et al., 2020).

² From the state of Mato Grosso do Sul in Brazil to the ports of northern Chile, with a corridor route running from Campo Grande and Puerto Murtinho in Brazil; Carmelo Peralta, Mariscal Estigarribia, and Pozo Hondo in Paraguay; Misión La Paz, Tartagal, Jujuy, and Salta in Argentina; Sico Jama Passes, Ports of Antofagasta, Mejillones and Iquique in Chile (Atienza et al., 2020).

Both projects have been part of the agenda of the South American Centre-West Integration Zone (Zicosur). The organization, made up of subnational governments from seven countries,³ was created in response to the “unfavorable situation” of the regions that comprise it compared to the nations to which they belong”, in which the lack of “infrastructure, centralization and concentration of power” are some of the essential points that give rise to their unbalanced situation in relation to the major centers of production and consumption (Consejo de Relaciones Internacionales de América Latina, 2020, p. 42).

Thus, Zicosur considers—among other purposes—the transport links and complementarity of its economies as key factors to strengthen exchanges and cooperation between regions remote from national centers (Cortez & Pizarro, 2018; Ibañez, 2017; Juste, 2021), but also from the distribution of benefits of organizations such as Mercosur (Botto, 2013). As a paradiplomacy initiative, Zicosur has developed strategies of a subnational character through its available resources in those provinces that are less economically advantaged but are strategically located on the borders of the bloc, promotes an integrationist project whose agenda exceeds economic-commercial issues, and also involves social and cultural aspects (Colacrai, 2016; Cortez & Pizarro, 2018).

Although the BOCs—both the IIRSA initiative and the CBV—have acquired strategic importance for their members and have a central place in their agenda, their action is limited by the centrality of other regional organizations and the reluctance of central governments. In short, despite the recognition of several efforts aimed at creating corridors that would allow the landlocked regions of the continent to access the sea and open up to international trade (Atienza et al., 2020), regionally promoted projects have yet to materialize.

The external initiatives of sub-state actors in Chile

In Chile, the international initiatives of subnational governments are defined by an institutional-legal context that does not facilitate paradiplomatic activity. The Political Constitution of the Republic defines the country as a unitary state with a strong presidential character. Regarding foreign policy, the President oversees the conduct of the country’s external relations in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Minrel).

Within the responsibilities and functioning of the Minrel, there are some aspects oriented toward subnational governments, as in the case of the position of regional coordinators, which correspond to officials appointed by the departmental minister “to act in different regions of the country, to support the latter in the realization of their projects and initiatives in the international arena” (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2018, art. 25). It also includes the existence of regional directorates, under the central government, dedicated to the promotion of exports and the internationalization of trade in the regions.

³ Provinces in Argentina, states in Brazil, departments in Bolivia and Paraguay, regions in Chile and Peru, and municipalities in Uruguay. Available at <https://zicosur.co/integrantes/>

Likewise, within the ministerial organization, the Regional Coordination Directorate (Dirección de Coordinación Regional, Dicore) is included, which is responsible for supporting “the international management initiatives of the regional governments, provincial governorships and municipalities of the country, maintaining a permanent working relation with their authorities” (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, n. d.). Dicore collaborates with the regional governments (gobierno regional, Gore), aiming to improve the management of cooperation with border regions or provinces and—in general—to support the regions in international matters of interest (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, n. d.). Dicore’s institutional website states:

Chile’s foreign policy is committed to creating the conditions for balanced territorial development by strengthening the capacity of regions and municipalities to participate in an increasingly interdependent and globalized world. (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, n. d.)

Despite these statements, Dicore has a low impact on international activities in the regions, as it does not have the legal powers, institutional framework, or resources to carry out the above declarations and functions. Thus, the international insertion mechanisms developed by the regions do not respond to a core policy of internationalization of the country in this area, which becomes evident when the scarce presence of the Dicore in the regions is observed (Correa et al., 2015).

At the level of the Gores, their powers in international matters are limited to weak legislation, denoted by their participation “in international cooperation initiatives in the region, within the legislation established by the treaties and conventions (...) [of] the Government of Chile” (Ministerio del Interior, 1992, art. 16); and in terms of the promotion and proper functioning of “intercommunal, interprovincial and international border transportation services in the region” (Ministerio del Interior, 1992, art. 17). Although, according to the legislation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the organs of the State administration—including the Gore—within their competencies “may enter into inter-institutional agreements of an international nature with foreign or international entities”, these must be previously reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2018). In addition, although most of the Gores have a Regional Unit for International Affairs (Unidad Regional de Asuntos Internacionales, URAI), these have different capacities, operations, and organizations. In some cases, the URAIs are staffed by only one officer.

In the case of local governments or municipalities in Chile, these do not have powers in foreign policy or paradiplomacy. Nevertheless, they also seek to carry out international initiatives, including international financing of projects, promoting their localities—mainly tourism—abroad, and cooperative activities with other municipalities. To this end, several of the country’s municipalities have international relations offices within their organizational structure.

In this context, subnational actors at different levels seek to deploy their international strategies. The following is an analysis of the cases of three of them in northern Chile and their international initiatives based on the vocs. These are the Gores of Arica-Parinacota and Antofagasta and the municipality of Iquique.

Subnational international initiatives in the Norte Grande of Chile

Chile is a unitary state that is administratively divided into regions. In the case of the northern part of the country, three are considered: Arica and Parinacota, Tarapacá, and Antofagasta. Regional governments administer regions in Chile through a governor. The regions have several municipalities, and the municipal administration is the mayor's responsibility. The following is an analysis of international action in the regions of Arica and Parinacota, and Antofagasta regions. Likewise, in the case of the Tarapacá region, since it does not have an international relations unit, the focus is on its most important municipality, Iquique, which has historically been characterized by the promotion of both the municipality and the region in the international arena.

Arica and Parinacota

The region of Arica and Parinacota is located in the extreme north of Chile, bordering Peru to the north, Bolivia to the east, the Tarapacá region to the south, and the Pacific Ocean to the west. The region was established as such quite late (2008),⁴ particularly due to its late incorporation into the Chilean State, formalized in 1929, with the Peace Treaty signed in Lima.

With the integration of Arica into Chilean sovereignty, the State developed a strategy aimed at reaffirming its territorial dominion, which included a greater rollout of military contingents, an increase in public officials, administrative and customs controls, restrictions on Peruvian investors, and educational policies that sought to "Chileanize" its inhabitants, among others (Podestá Arzubiaga, 2011, p. 129). Under this influence, during the second half of the 20th century, the city had higher levels of industrial development and a certain centrality and importance in national policies of economic development and social integration, evidenced in port liberalization and import substitution industrialization projects managed by the Junta de Adelanto de Arica⁵ (Dilla Alfonso, 2018).

During the 1970s, and as a consequence of the geopolitical strategy based on the hypothesis of neighboring conflict, the military government of the time put an end to this economic impulse, which was directly manifested in the dissolution of the Junta de Adelanto⁶ (Gobierno Regional de Arica y Parinacota, 2018), and in the creation of the Tarapacá region and the empowerment of the city of Iquique as its capital to the detriment of Arica. All of this limited the region's capacity to roll out strategies for economic development, infrastructure, and internationalization.

This situation continued, in part, with the return to democracy in the 1990s. On the one hand, the vision of Arica persisted as part of a "defensive strategy [and as a]

⁴ In 2008, the political-administrative division was reformed and the new region of Arica and Parinacota was created when the Tarapacá region was divided into two.

⁵ In accordance with the inward development strategy, in 1953 Arica was declared a free port and then in 1958 the Junta de Adelanto was created. From this body various comprehensive development initiatives were generated, mainly located in the city of Arica and indirectly and more recently in the inland localities (Gobierno Regional de Arica y Parinacota, 2018).

⁶ Decree Law No. 1.612 of December 10, 1976.

military enclave disconnected from national development”,⁷ as an “extreme zone” or “isolated” from the rest of the country (Correa et al., 2015). Meanwhile, in the dynamics of globalization, it began to be perceived as an international border and a pivot for development and integration around trade and export (Dilla Alfonso, 2018).

In this context and following the designation of Arica and Parinacota as a new region in 2008, Gore has sought to promote an agenda that seeks to alter the situation of isolation and geopolitical dispute. Thus, since its first Regional Development Strategy 2010-2011 (ERD, for its acronym in Spanish from *Estrategia Regional de Desarrollo*), the first strategic objective has been to establish a socially mature region based on internal integration and complementarity with neighboring countries (Gobierno Regional de Arica y Parinacota, 2009). To this end, the guidelines are to politically, economically, technically, and culturally integrate the region with the areas of Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina, with which there is existing or planned collaboration; facilitate cross-border links at all levels through paradiplomacy and the emerging channels of cooperation; and support integration measures that make sovereignty, security, and development criteria compatible, both in civilian and military institutions.

Although the subsequent ERD (2017-2030) mentions some aspects related to international issues, particularly concerning the region’s borders with two states and the need for greater initiatives along these lines, this matter is no longer a strategic objective in the new strategy. Thus, although the initial aim was to give primacy to international sub-state action, this has not been reflected in establishing an institutional framework nor in greater resources or capacity to carry out initiatives in this area. Thus, for example, the URAI in the region has only one official with limited powers and budget to carry out the external agenda. Thus, international projection through initiatives such as the BOCs, among others, is limited by the little room for maneuver that a new region with few resources has.

Despite the above, regarding infrastructure, Arica y Parinacota stands out for its port facilities, which significantly impact the region’s economy, as it is an important commercial and transportation hub for exports and imports to and from the Pacific.⁸ Likewise, the port sector has a significant impact on the transport, logistics, and services sectors, for which growth potential is projected with the “restoration of the railroad to La Paz, and the eventual realization of the so-called ‘Bioceanic Corridor,’ through which both Bolivian and Brazilian cargo would potentially leave” (Gobierno Regional de Arica y Parinacota, 2009, p. 50).

Regarding roads, the region has two main axes connecting it with the rest of the country, Peru, and Bolivia. Thus, in 2014, the region developed an International Action Plan, which included six projects,⁹ with a strong sense of promoting paradiplomacy and collaborative work among its subnational neighbors. Subsequently, in 2018, within Chile’s Northern Macro Zone, the combined services at the road, port, airport, and

⁷ Interview with Hermann Mondaca, former head of the Regional Unit of International Affairs of the Government of Arica and Parinacota (09/07/2021).

⁸ Interview with Marcelo Urrutia, president of Empresa Portuaria Arica (EPA), (08/12/2021).

⁹ Border integration and development committees; northern Chile’s macro zone; South American Centre-West Integration Zone, Zicosur; bioceanic corridors; subnational meetings; and promotion of the benefits and incentives for investing in Arica and Parinacota.

railway level were promoted as a commercial platform to the Asia Pacific region.¹⁰ This strategy added the region's adherence to Zicosur as a mechanism for regional integration and trade within the framework of BOC projects.

Nonetheless, the continuity of these measures was affected by the change of government and the consequent change of regional authorities, which impacted the management priorities of the Gore of Arica and Parinacota and its relations with its international peers. As a result, according to the protagonists, international initiatives ceased to be a priority, and the region reverted to a state of "two-frontier seclusion".¹¹ This, together with the low level of institutionalization and resources available to the international sub-state sphere in this region, is expressed in the perception of the region's promotion strategy in areas such as the BOCs:

(...) in the last 10 years, even since we became a region, we have never been able to position ourselves in this process. In this, the master, the author of all this, always came from our neighboring region of Iquique and Antofagasta, and in all the plans and proposals that they made, we were always excluded. (Interview with Patricio López Berrios, head of the Regional Unit of International Affairs, Government of Arica and Parinacota, 12/08/2021)

In addition to the above, there is limited interest at the central level in developing an autonomous multi-agency internationalization policy for Chile's regions and the scarce support of the Regional Coordination Directorate (Correa et al., 2015). Thus, despite the existence of a perception of increased autonomy in decision-making, it is claimed that "the centralism of the Foreign Ministry has inhibited the activities of the regions",¹² and it is noted that the design of service infrastructure is the responsibility of the respective ministries, which reduces the framework for action of the Gore¹³ and the aspiration to implement a logistics services platform for foreign trade in the region.¹⁴

Furthermore, the promotion, development, and materialization of projects such as the BOCs are hindered by the institutional and relational factors mentioned above, but also geopolitical variables and diplomatic disagreements (between Chile and both Bolivia and Peru) play an important role in the case of Arica and Parinacota. This has meant less concern for projects that include this region and greater attention to the Bioceanic Road Corridor, which does not include Arica but does include Tarapacá and Antofagasta.

¹⁰ Interview with Hermann Mondaca, in charge of the Regional Unit of International Affairs of the Government of Arica and Parinacota (09/07/2021).

¹¹ Interview with Hermann Mondaca, in charge of the Regional Unit of International Affairs of the Government of Arica and Parinacota (09/07/2021).

¹² Interview with Marcelo Urrutia, president of Empresa Portuaria Arica (EPA), (08/12/2021).

¹³ Interview with Patricio López Berrios, head of the Regional Unit of International Affairs of the Government of Arica and Parinacota (08/12/2021).

¹⁴ Interview with Manuel Rodríguez, regional director of Corporación de Fomento de la Producción Región de Arica y Parinacota (09/06/2021); Patricio López Berrios, head of the Regional Unit of International Affairs of the Government of Arica and Parinacota (08/12/2021).

Tarapacá (municipality of Iquique)

The city of Iquique is the capital of the Tarapacá region. This region is bordered to the north by Arica-Parinacota, to the south by Antofagasta, to the east by Bolivia and the west by the Pacific Ocean. The Tarapacá region has important mining activity, while Iquique concentrates on services, commerce, and tourism. Unlike the regions described above, the Gore de Tarapacá does not currently have a URAI. Nevertheless, international activity is concentrated in the municipality of Iquique.

Iquique has a long internationalist tradition due to its status as a maritime port and the existence of a free trade zone but also to the efforts of its local authorities. Although municipalities in Chile have little institutional room for maneuvering for internationalization, Iquique has managed to progress in this area.

In the case of Tarapacá, the BOC project has been strongly promoted by one of the region's recognized leaders, the current senator and former mayor of Iquique, Jorge Soria. Since the beginning of his political career in the 1960s, he has actively promoted the defense of the BOC (Barros et al., 2020), in addition to his active participation in the creation of Zicosur, together with the authorities of Antofagasta, as a mechanism for subnational integration. In this context, with the early establishment of the Iquique Free Trade Zone (Zofri) in 1975, the region was empowered to become a service platform where the BOCs could complement the border areas of the South American Centre-West economically, and at the same time act as a bridge to the South Asian market and the South American sub-region (Barros et al., 2020).

In terms of infrastructure, although Iquique has a port considered important, it concentrates on the import of containerized products destined for inland countries, especially Bolivia and Paraguay.¹⁵ According to the report prepared by the Bioceanic Corridor Web Platform,¹⁶ it cannot handle significant cargo volumes and potential demand from the Zicosur area countries. In addition, there are no competitive advantages over the Atlantic ports and the costs of exporting to the countries of the Asia-Pacific region (Corredor Bioceánico, 2021, p. 69). All this leaves the Tarapacá region in an unfavorable situation in terms of the rollout of economic incentives, which adds to the fact that the central government has not promoted initiatives aimed at strengthening the region as a service platform, such as the Integrated Territorial Program (PTI, for its acronym in Spanish from Programa Territorial Integrado) Logistics Platform implemented in Antofagasta.¹⁷

As for the relation with other regional actors in international matters, the involvement of the municipality of Iquique in the field of BOCs is carried out informally, often at the expense of the Gore and the central government. Despite Iquique's historical and sustained engagement in the promotion of BOCs, as the mayor himself and his international advisory team maintain, the municipality has no coordination with the Gore, which leads to the exclusion of this type of project and inconsistency

¹⁵ Interview with Ramón Luís Muñoz, former manager of the PTI Plataforma Logística Antofagasta (08/23/2021).

¹⁶ Implemented through the agreement "Capacity Building for the Bioceanic Corridor", code BIP 40013501-0, signed between the Regional Government of Antofagasta and the Universidad Católica del Norte, through its Institute of Applied Regional Economics.

¹⁷ Interview with Ramón Luís Muñoz, former manager of the PTI Plataforma Logística Antofagasta (08/23/2021).

with the foreign policy deployed from the central level, which should consider the different actors involved.¹⁸ The mayor also points out that international strategies among subnational actors should be collaborative, so more ports and experiences are needed to carry out initiatives such as the BOCs.¹⁹

In turn, the relation of the municipality of Iquique with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the central level, in the absence of an institutional framework to facilitate it, is developed informally through pressure or personal contacts.²⁰ At the same time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs often reproaches the municipality for conducting international relations, so these and their associated initiatives—among them, the BOCs—must be carried out through other channels.²¹

Antofagasta

The Antofagasta region is located between the Tarapacá (north) and Atacama (south) regions, bordered to the east by Bolivia (department of Potosí) and Argentina (provinces of Catamarca, Jujuy, and Salta) and to the west by the Pacific Ocean. Antofagasta is one of Chile's main mining regions, and its port is an important point for the movement of minerals out of the country.

The Gore of Antofagasta has been deploying an international strategy that spans several decades and includes numerous initiatives. In 2013, it even presented a regional integration and internationalization policy, considering that since the 1990s, these have been key elements for the region's development and growth (Gobierno Regional de Antofagasta, 2013). In this context, the BOCs have become one of the main internationalization and international cooperation initiatives in this region, specifically, the CBV or Bioceanic Corridor of the Tropic of Capricorn, which connects the port of Antofagasta with Argentina by road.

Indeed, the regional policy (2013) recognizes, among the main infrastructure works in the region, the development of ports (Mejillones and Antofagasta) and border controls and their use as trade platforms from the Zicosur and Argentina to the Asia Pacific region through the BOCs. However, the same policy states some problems and challenges associated with these, among which are the lack of rail infrastructure for the enhancement of the BOC; and the need to “generate the enabling conditions of the BOC for the use of the road, rail, port and airport services in the region” (Gobierno Regional de Antofagasta, 2013, p. 92). Above all, there is a need to establish relations of strategic complementarity with the regions of Tarapacá and Atacama in order to “enhance a medium and long-term strategic vision of the foreign trade complex with Asia-Pacific markets based on the implementation of the bioceanic corridors”

¹⁸ Interview with Mauricio Soria, Mayor of Iquique, and his team of international advisors, German Campuy and Alejandro Álvarez (10/14/2021).

¹⁹ Interview with Mauricio Soria, Mayor of Iquique, and his team of international advisors, German Campuy and Alejandro Álvarez (10/14/2021).

²⁰ Interview with Mauricio Soria, Mayor of Iquique, and his team of international advisors, German Campuy and Alejandro Álvarez (10/14/2021).

²¹ Interview with Mauricio Soria, Mayor of Iquique, and his team of international advisors, German Campuy and Alejandro Álvarez (10/14/2021).

(Gobierno Regional de Antofagasta, 2013, p. 92). In the external sphere implied by the BOCs, among the investment initiatives to be developed is the Regional Strategy for trade integration of goods and services with the subnational states of the Zicosur and Asia-Pacific, which aims to boost trade relations and exchanges and make the available infrastructure operational, so that the region can become a trading platform (Gobierno Regional de Antofagasta, 2013).

As stated, the Antofagasta region, through its Gore, has deployed international strategies and policies where BOCs appear as relevant elements for promoting its development. Nevertheless, several aspects have hindered the implementation of the BOCs and the full rollout of regional foreign policy measures or paradiplomacy.

In terms of infrastructure, although the Antofagasta region has extensive port facilities, they are primarily used by the mining sector, with little use for other areas that could be associated with BOCs.²² Likewise, the extensive road network is mainly used by this sector. On the other hand, although there have been plans for railroad initiatives to cross from Paraguay to Chile through the Antofagasta region, thus strengthening the BOC, these have not materialized.²³ Despite the interest of countries such as China in carrying out this type of project, it is reported that there is no willingness on the part of government authorities at the central level.²⁴ In this context, improving infrastructure and service conditions for the BOCs is a determining factor for greater interest in them, on the part of private actors, for example.²⁵

Regarding the relation with other regional governments, the authorities in Antofagasta state that, despite meetings and relations, there are no common strategies, plans, or objectives among them at the national level. External bodies, such as Zicosur, are the platforms for coordinating cooperation between Chile's regions and positioning them²⁶ in the spectrum of cities in the southern countries of Latin America:

[Zicosur] is the best example of territorial, subnational work (...); it is our flag to work jointly with other regions, it has made it possible to position ourselves and progress (...). Starting with Salta, we added others like El Chaco, Jujuy, and Tucumán. (Interview with Claudio Pizarro, Regional Unit of International Affairs of the Government of Antofagasta, 08/23/2021)

The links between the Gores, from the perspective of Antofagasta (for example, for the former superintendents César Castillo and Valentín Volta and the URAI official Claudio Pizarro), are perceived as more cooperative than conflictive, where the BOCs appear as opportunities for complementarity,²⁷ which can contribute to the development

²² Interview with Claudio Pizarro, Regional Unit of International Affairs of the Government of Antofagasta (08/23/2021).

²³ Interview with Valentín Volta, former Superintendent of the Antofagasta region and president of Zicosur 2014-2016 (08/23/2021).

²⁴ Interview with César Castillo, former Superintendent of the Antofagasta Region 1994-2000 (08/24/2021).

²⁵ Interview with Valentín Volta, former Superintendent of the Antofagasta region and president of Zicosur 2014-2016 (08/23/2021).

²⁶ Interview with Claudio Pizarro, Regional Unit of International Affairs of the Government of Antofagasta (08/23/2021).

²⁷ Interview with Claudio Pizarro, Regional Unit of International Affairs of the Government of Antofagasta (08/23/2021).

of the country, by “moving toward an east-west development axis”,²⁸ incorporating the cities of the countries that make up the BOC with the aim of contributing to its orientation toward the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, although BOCs are seen as an opportunity for interregional and international cooperation, it is also pointed out that there should be national policies to encourage this type of work.²⁹

Accordingly, the relation of the Gore with the central level, in this case with the Minrel, has some difficulties, denoted by the perception of remoteness and lack of interest of this institution in regional issues and the lack of renewal and operationalization of the agenda of this ministry. Indeed, it is argued that the various central governments have not supported regional initiatives such as the BOCs but that these have been undertaken by the subnational administrations and Zicosur themselves:³⁰ “The regions have done the work”.³¹ Although there have been governments with greater support for the regions and their international undertakings, a centralist attitude and a certain disdain and ignorance of the international policy of the regions and cooperation bodies such as Zicosur have prevailed.³² This is also reflected, for example, in the centralist impression that some former regional superintendents have of Minrel and its lack of vision and innovation in the design and practice of foreign policy.³³

For example, it is observed that bodies such as the integration committees, directed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are not efficient and lack concrete results, so the Antofagasta region seeks direct relations with other regions outside the national borders.³⁴ Although some Foreign Ministers have emphasized these committees more, they have not been given greater powers.³⁵ In addition, on specific issues such as the BOCs, the central level limits participation to a few actors, without incorporating, for example, the mayors.³⁶ Finally, the current situation is uncertain, as there are no definitions of how the institutional changes that have recently affected the country—mainly the new law on Gore—will impact the international relations of the regions.³⁷

²⁸ Interview with Valentín Volta, former Superintendent of the Antofagasta Region, and president of Zicosur 2014-2016 (08/23/2021).

²⁹ Interview with César Castillo, former Superintendent of the Antofagasta Region 1994-2000 (08/24/2021).

³⁰ Interview with Valentín Volta, former Superintendent of the Antofagasta Region, and president of Zicosur 2014-2016 (08/23/2021).

³¹ Interview with César Castillo, former Superintendent of the Antofagasta Region 1994-2000 (08/24/ 2021).

³² Interview with Valentín Volta, former Superintendent of the Antofagasta Region, and president of Zicosur 2014-2016 (08/23/2021).

³³ Interview with Valentín Volta, former Superintendent of the Antofagasta Region, and president of Zicosur 2014-2016 (08/23/2021).

³⁴ Interview with Claudio Pizarro, Regional Unit of International Affairs, Government of Antofagasta 1994-2000 (08/23/2021).

³⁵ Interview with César Castillo, former Superintendent of the Antofagasta Region 1994-2000 (08/24/021).

³⁶ Interview with Claudio Pizarro, Regional Unit of International Affairs of the Government of Antofagasta (08/23/2021).

³⁷ Interview with Claudio Pizarro, Regional Unit of International Affairs of the Government of Antofagasta (08/23/2021).

Conclusions

Subnational international activity in Latin America occurs within a context of opportunities provided by globalization, interdependence in the international system, and restrictions due to the reminiscences of state centralism. The latter, as has been noted in the literature, has been a determining factor in the conduct of the foreign policies of Latin American states, where the processes of state formation and development have contributed to the concentration of power in the capitals to the detriment of the regions, especially in the case of those located far from the center and close to the national borders. Consequently, although the regions carry out external relations with their counterparts and take part in cooperative projects, they do so with restrictions on their autonomy and the resources required for their realization (Álvarez et al., 2022; González M. et al., 2016; Linares, 2005).

Such is the case of the BOCS, which, despite their multiple advantages—improved transport links, development of communication routes, industrial and tourism corridors, increased government revenues, among others (Herbas Camacho & Molina, 2005; Iirsa, 2003; Inostroza Fernández & Bolívar Espinoza, 2004)—and effective international cooperation initiatives at different levels (regional, subregional, national, public, and private) have yet to be fully implemented.

On the one hand, the liberal “promise”—and that of open regionalism—of integration for the free flow of goods across borders, from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, and the achievement of mutual benefits has been hindered by various historical, political, and consensus-building factors among central actors, which particularly affects subnational governments and regions considered as isolated or peripheral. On the other hand, subnational actors interested in the development and promotion of BOCS, although their claims are hindered by the numerous restrictions described above, continue to carry out international initiatives through bodies such as Zicosur, which in some way go beyond the issues exclusively linked to the expected material benefits associated with the construction of these projects.

Indeed, in the cases of the subnational governments of northern Chile analyzed in this article, it can be seen how BOCS are not only perceived as opportunities for the interests of the regions but also as possibilities for cooperation and consensus-building among actors facing similar difficulties in achieving their goals.

The limits of subnational international initiatives

Overall, it is possible to observe that in Chile, no institutional framework facilitates the international initiatives of subnational governments; on the contrary, there is a strong centralism in the conduct of foreign policy.

Indeed, the country's international activity is framed within the constitutional definitions that grant broad prerogatives to the President in the central definitions in this area and leaves it largely in the hands of the Minrel, leaving a little margin to—in this case—the regional governments and other sub-state actors such as the municipalities. Although within this legislation, organizational figures aim to highlight the importance

of the regions, as in the case of the regional coordinators and Dicore, these depend on the central power and have few powers and resources to fulfill their institutional mission. Meanwhile, regional governments also have regulatory limitations that hinder their international activity, since their initiatives are subordinated to the central government, in addition to the fact that their internal organization for international management—in many cases—is underdeveloped. At the level of municipalities, they do not even have the authority for international deployment.

In this context, subnational actors develop their external initiatives, which harms the implementation of projects such as BOCs. In the case of Arica, in addition to these difficulties, this region is considered “extreme” and isolated from the center, where traditional geopolitical disputes persist and, at the same time, there are opportunities for economic development as an international border, adjacent to two neighboring countries and with access to the Pacific. In this context, the Gore of Arica has implemented development strategies that consider the international aspect in its agenda but lack institutional and human resources to carry them out. Although the region of Arica and Parinacota has an important port and road infrastructure connected to Bolivia, Peru, and the rest of the country, and seeks to project itself internationally as a gateway to the Asia-Pacific region, where BOC projects are key to this end, no concrete progress has been made in their materialization.

Evidence shows that changes in regional authorities and agenda priorities have undermined projected international strategies, impacting on the relations with subnational peers and international neighbors. This is compounded by the centralism, the regions’ lack of autonomy in external matters and—above all—the reluctance of the national authorities to promote initiatives such as the BOCs more strongly. They are also affected by diplomatic disagreements with neighboring countries.

The Antofagasta region also has attractive border, road, and port characteristics and strong mining activity, making it an actor with significant international potential. Indeed, the Gore has pursued an international strategy for several decades and has an internationalization policy. Among other activities, these have materialized in the promotion of its ports through projects such as the Capricorn BOC and active participation in Zicosur. Nevertheless, difficulties have also been identified for their effective implementation, such as the lack of railway infrastructure, the almost exclusive concentration on regional mining activity, and the integration of other logistics and infrastructure services, which limits the generation of value chains beyond the borders. Regarding Antofagasta’s relations with the central level, although there are no evident problems linked to geopolitical issues, as in the case of Arica, it is possible to note that there is a perception of disinterest by Minrel in the foreign affairs of the regions and their initiatives such as the BOCs, given which the regional governments have sought to relate directly with their external peers through bodies such as Zicosur.

In the Tarapacá region, which has historically sought to project itself internationally, driven by its local authorities, BOCs have become one of its main aspirations. Although the various subnational governments have actively promoted these projects, the region has problems with port infrastructure and transport links that hinder its projection as a platform for the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, although the municipality of Iquique is currently making multiple efforts and carrying out international initiatives

based on the BOCs, it does not have the regulatory powers or institutional conditions to facilitate their implementation. Thus, there is a relation of informality in international activity, which generates problems at the central level and overlaps with the already limited powers of the Gore.

Consequently, even though subnational actors carry out international strategies and activities, they face a series of intra—and extra—regional constraints that, in the case of the BOCs, have undermined their materialization several decades after the projection of these initiatives. Nonetheless, identifying these limitations, based on the experiences in northern Chile and its relevant actors, makes it possible to glimpse some alternatives to advance in implementing international cooperation and integration initiatives in at least three ways, which can be applied to other regional cases.

First, there is a lack of planning and coordination regarding infrastructure and services to take advantage of opportunities for cooperation between regions within the same country. Although some regions have road and port infrastructure, the strategies they develop—for example, to integrate these with the service areas—are limited to the intra-regional level. The development of plans that functionally cover multiple regions and actors, considering the capacities and needs of each region and its relation with the outside world, could contribute to the use and materialization of initiatives such as the BOCs.

Secondly, despite links and meetings between subnational actors of the same State, these are not developed continuously with clear objectives, well-designed plans, or at an institutional level. To this end, it is noteworthy that the most regular contacts, in the case of the BOCs, are carried out through international bodies such as Zicosur and are not coordinated from the central level. The support (institutional, political, and resources) from this level to organizations such as Zicosur could help make these projects a reality and reduce the informality of paradiplomatic relations. Above all, it would make it possible to move toward sustained international relations by integrating both the benefits of cooperation and the identities that have developed over time based on the common objectives of subnational actors.

Thirdly, it is necessary to delve deeper into the relationship between subnational governments and the central level in international matters, which is not only determined by the lack of institutions or resources that allow regional actors to develop their international activity, but also takes into account the perceptions of the center toward the regions, whether in terms of geopolitical concepts or isolation, which generate skepticism and mutual distrust that result, in general, in the lack of implementation of initiatives undertaken by subnational actors and, in particular, in the materialization of projects such as the BOCs. Undoubtedly, changing these perceptions and relations requires deeper transformations, which are beyond this article's scope but must be considered so that the opportunities offered by the international environment and the desire for integration are projected and materialized beyond each region's legitimate aspirations and initiatives.

Acknowledgments

This article was made possible thanks to funding from the Fondecyt Regular Project 1190133: “La intermediación urbano-portuaria en un contexto transfronterizo: Arica (2008-2018).” The authors would like to thank Marcelo Urrutia, Patricio López Berrios, Manuel Rodríguez, Mauricio Soria, Claudio Pizarro, Valentín Volta, César Castillo, Hermann Mondaca, Germán Gampuy, and Alejandro Álvarez for their comments and opinions.

References

- Aldecoa, F. & Keating, M. (Eds.). (2001). *Paradiplomacia: las relaciones internacionales de las regiones*. Marcial Pons.
- Álvarez Fuentes, G. & Ovando Santana, C. (2020, June). Cambio y continuidad en la Cancillería chilena. De la influencia militar a la consolidación economicista. *Revista Izquierdas*, (49), 4080-4102. http://www.izquierdas.cl/images/pdf/2020/n49/art193_4080_4102.pdf
- Álvarez, G., Ovando, C. & Piñones, C. (2022). Questioned sovereignty and challenged diplomacies: the case of the Aymara people and the State of Chile. *Journal of Borderland Studies*, 37(2), 339-358. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2020.1768885>
- Atienza, M., Cortés, H., Franco, L. & Rodrigo, L. M. (2020). *Entender el corredor bioceánico vial. Los relatos de los expertos y de la región de Antofagasta*. Corredor Bioceánico. <https://corredorbioceanico.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Relatos-del-Corredor.pdf>
- Barros, P. S., Padula, R., Severo, L. W., Samurio, S. E. & Gonçalves, J. S. B. (2020). *Corredor Carretero Bioceánico: camino de Mato Grosso do Sul a Asia Pacífico* (Documentos de trabajos DT010/20, Observatorio América Latina Asia Pacífico). Aladi/CAF/Cepal. http://www2.aladi.org/biblioteca/Publicaciones/ALADI/Observatorio/Documentos_Trabajo/OBS_AL_AP_DT_010_2020.pdf
- Barros, P. S., Padula, R., Severo, L. W., Samurio, S. E. & Gonçalves, J. S. B. (2021). *Corredor bioceánico de Mato Grosso do Sul ao pacífico: produção e comércio na rota da integração sul-americana*. Editora UEMS/Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada. <https://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/handle/11058/10598>
- Boisier, S. (2003). Globalización, geografía política y fronteras. *Anales de Geografía de la Universidad Complutense*, 23, 21-39. <https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/AGUC/article/view/AGUC0303110021A>
- Botto, M. (2013). Integración regional y actores subnacionales. El caso del Mercosur. *Revista Temas y Debates*, (25), 83-106. <https://doi.org/10.35305/tyd.v0i25.243>
- Bouzas, R. & Knaack, P. (2009, January-June). El BID y medio siglo de integración regional en América Latina y el Caribe. *Integración & Comercio*, 13(29), 15-27. <https://publications.iadb.org/publications/spanish/viewer/Revista-Integraci%C3%B3n-Comercio-A%C3%B1o-13-No-29-Enero-junio-2009.pdf>

- Carciofi, R. & Gayá, R. (2016). Integración física en América Latina. Una revisión de la experiencia reciente y lecciones de política. *Boletín Informativo Techint*, (351), 13-54. <http://iosapp.boletintechint.com/Utils/DocumentPDF.ashx?Codigo=8b3064f7-a6c3-4155-8f89-d0ab127330a9&IdType=2>
- Cid, G. (2013, September-December). Nacionalizando memorias periféricas: conmemoraciones y nacionalismo chileno en las regiones de Antofagasta y Tarapacá, 1879-1910. *História Unisinos*, 17(3), 216-227. <https://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/historia/article/view/htu.2013.173.02/3716>
- Colacrai, M. (2016). Cuando la frontera dialoga: singularidades de la relación argentino-chilena en las últimas décadas. *Estudios Fronterizos*, 17(34), 85-99. <https://doi.org/10.21670/ref.2016.34.a05>
- Consejo de Relaciones Internacionales de América Latina. (2020). *Informe Celac-China. Avances hacia el 2021*. <http://chinayamericalatina.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/InfCELAC4.pdf>
- Correa, L., Salas, A., Soza-Amigo, S. & García, V. (2015, July-August). Entre el conflicto y el aislamiento: desarrollo, gobernabilidad y seguridad en las zonas fronterizas del norte y el sur de Chile a comienzos del siglo XXI. *Idesia*, 33(3), 73-77. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-34292015000300011>
- Corredor Bioceánico. (2021). *Descripción de puertos de la macro región norte de Chile*. <https://corredorbioceanico.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/DESCRIPCION-DE-PUERTOS-DE-LA-MACRO-REGION-NORTE-DE-CHILE.pdf>
- Cortez, G. & Pizarro, C. (2018). Zicosur haciendo integración en el centro oeste de América del Sur. *Diplomacia*, (139), 58-63. <https://zicosur.co/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/SQ-REVISTA-DIPLOMACIA-139-Diciembre-2018-WEB-compressed.pdf>
- Dilla Alfonso, H. (2018). Arica entre tres fronteras. *Estudios atacameños*, (57), 221-238. <http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-10432018005000301>
- Durán Lima, J. E. & Masi, F. (2007). *Diagnóstico de las asimetrías en los procesos de integración de América del Sur*. Cepal. https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/3579/S2007304_es.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
- Estefane, A. (2014). Archivos, diplomacia e historiografía en el siglo XIX. Apuntes sobre el caso chileno [Dossier]. *Escrituras Americanas*, (1), 8-23. <https://red.pucp.edu.pe/riel/biblioteca/archivos-diplomacia-e-historiografia-en-el-siglo-xix-apuntes-sobre-el-caso-chileno/>
- Fuentes Vera, C. (2014). La política exterior de la transición chilena desde sus fuentes internas. *Si Somos Americanos. Revista de Estudios Transfronterizos*, 14(2), 133-157. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0719-09482014000200006>
- Gobierno Regional de Antofagasta. (2013). *Política regional de integración e internacionalización de la región de Antofagasta*.
- Gobierno Regional de Arica y Parinacota. (2009). *Estrategia regional de desarrollo Arica y Parinacota. Diversidad, historia, integración, cultura, turismo, unidad*. https://www.subdere.cl/sites/default/files/documentos/erd_arica_y_parinacota_-_periodo_2009_2010.pdf

- Gobierno Regional de Arica y Parinacota. (2018). *Estrategia regional de desarrollo Arica y Parinacota, 2017-2030. Enfoque basado en el desarrollo humano*. [https://www.gorearicayparinacota.cl/images/Estrategia%20Regional/ERD%20ESTUDIO%202017%20-%202030%20GORE%20AYP%20\(Digital\).pdf](https://www.gorearicayparinacota.cl/images/Estrategia%20Regional/ERD%20ESTUDIO%202017%20-%202030%20GORE%20AYP%20(Digital).pdf)
- González M., S., Cornago P., N. & Ovando S., C. (2016). *Relaciones transfronterizas y paradiplomacia en América Latina. Aspectos teóricos y estudio de casos*. RiL Editores.
- González Miranda, S. (2004). Pax castrense en la frontera norte: una reflexión en torno a la post-guerra del Salitre: el conflicto por Tacna-Arica y Tarapacá. *Universum (Talca)*, 19(1), 28-57. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-23762004000100003>
- González Miranda, S. (2009). La presencia boliviana en la sociedad del salitre y la nueva definición de la frontera: auge y caída de una dinámica transfronteriza (Tarapacá 1880-1930). *Chungará (Arica), Revista de Antropología Chilena*, 41(1), 71-81. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0717-73562009000100005>
- Herbas Camacho, G. & Molina, S. (2005). *Irsa y la integración regional*. Observatorio Social de América Latina, 6(17). <https://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/bitstream/CLACSO/13659/1/41Camach.pdf>
- Ibañez, M. P. (2017). La integración subnacional como una dimensión de la Gestión Internacional de las Provincias el caso de Salta en Zicosur. In L. M. Barreto (Comp.), *Integrando saberes: experiencias de gestión internacional en gobiernos subnacionales* (pp. 111-158). Universidad Nacional de Rosario. <https://rephip.unr.edu.ar/handle/2133/9310>
- Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana (Iirsa). (2003). *Herramienta de trabajo para el diseño de una visión estratégica de la integración física suramericana*.
- Inostroza Fernández, L. & Bolívar Espinoza, A. (2004). Corredores bioceánicos: territorios, políticas y estrategias de integración subregional. *Análisis Económico*, 19(41), 157-174. <https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/413/41304107.pdf>
- Jessop, B. (2003). The political economy of scale and the construction of cross-border micro-regions. In F. Söderbaum & T. Shaw (Eds.), *Theories of new regionalism* (pp. 179-196). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Juste, S. (2021). Zicosur, paradiplomacia y recursos naturales: el litio y la vinculación con China. *Si Somos Americanos. Revista de Estudios Transfronterizos*, 21(1), 7-31. <https://www.sisomosamericanos.cl/index.php/sisomosamericanos/article/view/1006>
- Juste, S. & Oddone, N. (2020, December). Aportes teóricos para el estudio de la cooperación transfronteriza de unidades subestatales de doble periferia. *Cupea. Cuadernos de Política Exterior Argentina*, (132), 63-78. <https://doi.org/10.35305/cc.vi132.95>
- Keating, M. (2001). Paradiplomacia y constitución de redes regionales. *Revista Valenciana d'Estudis Autonòmics*, (36), 39-50.
- Lecours, A. (2002). Paradiplomacy: reflections on the foreign policy and international relations of regions. *International Negotiation*, 7(1), 91-114. <https://doi.org/10.1163/157180602401262456>

- Linares, R. (2005, November). Zona de Integración Fronteriza (ZIF) y su dimensión territorial en la frontera Táchira (Venezuela)-norte de Santander (Colombia). *Aldea Mundo*, 10(19), 45-54. <https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=54301906>
- Maira, L. (Comp.). (2010). *La política internacional subnacional en América Latina*. Libros del Zorzal.
- Malamud, A. (2005). Presidential diplomacy and the institutional underpinnings of Mercosur: an empirical examination. *Latin American Research Review*, 40(1), 138-164. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1555368>
- Malamud, A. & Gardini, G. L. (2012). Has regionalism peaked? The Latin American quagmire and its lessons. *The International Spectator*, 47(1), 116-133.
- Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. (n. d.). *Dirección de Coordinación Regional*. <https://www.minrel.gob.cl/politica-exterior/secretaria-general-de-politica-exterior/dicore>
- Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. (2018, March 20). *Ley núm. 21.080. Modifica diversos cuerpos legales con el objeto de modernizar el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores*. Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile. <https://bcn.cl/216kf>
- Ministerio del Interior. (1992, November 11). *Ley 19.175. Ley Orgánica Constitucional sobre Gobierno y Administración Regional*. Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile. <https://bcn.cl/2ltpi>
- Moncayo S., H.-L. (2012). Hacia una estrategia de incidencia de la sociedad civil en Unasur. In H.-L. Moncayo S. [Coord.], *Unasur: opciones de participación de la sociedad civil* (pp. 12-36). ILSA. http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/Colombia/ilsa/20170809031140/pdf_995.pdf
- Oddone, N. & Ramos, J. M. (Coords.). (2018). *Integración y paradiplomacia transfronteriza: experiencias comparadas del río Bravo hasta la Patagonia* (T. 1). El Colegio de la Frontera Norte.
- Oddone, N., Quiroga Barrera Oro, M., Sartori de Almeida Prado, H. & Williner, A. (2016). *Pactos territoriales en la construcción de regiones transfronterizas: por una mayor integración a múltiples niveles* (Serie Desarrollo Territorial N° 20). Cepal. <https://hdl.handle.net/11362/40606>
- Podestá Arzubíaga, J. (2011). Regiones fronterizas y flujos culturales: la peruanidad en una región chilena. *Revista Universum*, 26(1), 123-137. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-23762011000100008>
- Rozas, P. (2010, August). América Latina: problemas y desafíos del financiamiento de la infraestructura. *Revista Cepal*, (101), 59-83. <https://repositorio.cepal.org/handle/11362/11406>
- Serje de la Ossa, M. (2017). Fronteras y periferias en la historia del capitalismo: el caso de América Latina. *Revista de Geografía Norte Grande*, (66), 33-48. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-34022017000100003>
- Suarez Arevalo, J. (1997). *Infraestructuras e integración en el cono sur*. <http://observatoriogeograficoamericalatina.org.mx/egal6/Geografiasocioeconomica/Geografiaregional/179.pdf>.
- Zibechi, R. (2016, 13 de enero). *Raúl Zibechi reflexiona sobre evaluación de la Iirsa. Interconexión sin integración: 15 años de Iirsa*. Centro de Derechos Económicos y Sociales (CDES). <https://cdes.org.ec/web/interconexion-sin-integracion-15-anos-de-iirsa/>

Gonzalo Álvarez

Chilean. Doctor in América Latina contemporánea from the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain. He is a researcher and professor at the Instituto de Estudios Internacionales (Inte) of the Universidad Arturo Prat (Chile). Director of the journal *Si Somos Americanos. Revista de Estudios Transfronterizos*. Research lines: international relations, foreign policy, indigenous peoples. Recent publication: Álvarez, G. & Ovando, C. (2022). Indigenous peoples and paradiplomacy: confronting the state-centric order from Latin American transborder spaces. *Territory, Politics, Governance*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2022.2030248>

Giovana Gómez Amigo

Chilean. Master in political science, public policy mention by the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Specialist in policy analysis, she has worked in public institutions, such as the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security of Chile, and academics, such as the Instituto de Estudios Internacionales of the Universidad Arturo Prat. Currently working in the National Service of Disaster Prevention and Response. Research lines: design and implementation of policies. Recent publication: Álvarez, G. & Gómez, G. (2022, July-December). Fuerzas armadas en orden interno: normalización de la excepcionalidad chilena. *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, (114), 115-135. <https://storage.googleapis.com/jnl-lasa-j-erlacs-files/journals/1/articles/10917/submission/proof/10917-1-24109-1-10-20221212.pdf>

Haroldo Dilla Alfonso

Chilean. Sociologist and historian. Doctor of the Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Switzerland. Director and professor of the Instituto de Estudios Internacionales (Inte) of the Universidad Arturo Prat (Chile). Research lines: border studies and urban sociology. Recent publication: Dilla Alfonso, H., Cabezas, M. F. & Contreras Vera, C. (2022). El puerto como articulador de situaciones transfronterizas: el caso de Arica (Chile). *Revista Pueblos y fronteras*. <https://doi.org/10.22201/cimsur.18704115e.2022.v17.570>